The endgame process
After the negotiations entered mediation, one of the very first acts of the state mediator was to bring in somebody (“Kate”, the interim director of something) from Education Minnesota to work with the MFT negotiation team.  It was Emma’s assessment that Kate had a significant role on the MFT team.  Rob didn’t acknowledge Kate’s participation.

As with the earlier phase of negotiations, the mediated negotiations took place in the MFT building, but now with the two negotiation teams located in separate rooms, and the mediator shuttling between.  This arrangement apparently dropped the hourly productivity of the negotiations compared to the first phase, as the conversation only continued with one or the other team.  Both Rob and Emma described the process as involving long periods of waiting for the other team to respond.  However, the room-to-room conversation was interspersed with periodic face-to-face conversations between the leaders of the teams and the state mediator.  These conversations almost always involved Emma and Bernadeia Johnson (the administration's Chief Academic Officer) from the administration’s table and Rob and Kate from the MFT table.

Rob described the six weeks of mediation as largely waiting for the administration to drop one demand after another.  Rob talked about the administration being generally non-collaborative and obstructive in their proposals.  He said that the administration was often unreasonable, sometimes offering regressive responses to MFT proposals.  Rob said that MFT was "close to walking away from the table a couple times".

Emma described the time of mediated negotiation as MFT slowly realizing that they had to accept change.  Emma also said that at one point, the administration team did essentially walk away from the table, announcing that their part of the conversation was over if MFT could not get somewhere with interview-and-select.  Emma thought this was a turning point in the negotiations, where the teachers finally said they would find a way to work something out.

The money issue
Rob said that negotiating about the financial elements of the contract was difficult because the information about the district’s budget was unreliable and because the administration didn’t have a good grip on the budget numbers.  Emma said that the negotiations involved multiple days focused on the financial details of the contract, whereas in the last negotiation session, the financial piece of the contract was resolved in a few hours.

Part of the administration’s proposal entering into mediation was to shift the entire MFT salary schedule to the ATTPS plan for the 08/09 school year (ATTPS is an alternative to the traditional step-and-lane pay structure, which accesses dedicated funds from the State for teacher alternative-compensation programs.  ATTPS involves some performance-related pay structures).  The ATTPS proposal seemed to be a point of some contention, and the contract ratified in January put off a decision on ATTPS until after the main contract was settled.  Emma says that roughly two-thirds of MPS teachers are on the ATTPS pay schedule, and that number increases every time the program gets renewed by membership vote.

Rob said that Louise Sundin’s support for the pay-for-performance of the TAP program (a sub-set of ATTPS program, at certain schools) was a primary reason that he chose to challenge her for the MFT presidency two years ago (Louise had been the union president for 20+ years, Rob's successful challenge to her was an upset).  Rob was incensed that the administration even included an expansion of ATTPS in their proposal, saying that the inclusion of this in a positional bargaining proposal was inappropriate as a unilateral proposal from the administration.

In MFT contract negotiations, it is apparently customary to review the general financial picture of MPS as part of negotiating the pay and benefits for teachers.  I witnessed the first financial discussion of the negotiations in August, when MPS CFO Peggy Ingison presented a description of the MPS budget picture to both teams of negotiators.  Following her presentation, Rob and other teachers grilled her on the fine points of the budget.

Having the MPS budget as a starting point for negotiating the contract financials presents a challenge.  The MPS budget is a monstrosity that may not be fully understood by any one person.  Peggy Ingison herself was quoted in the Star Tribune shortly after her start at MPS about a year ago as saying that the district was "flying blind" with respect to the budget.  Given this, it is reasonable to assume that all parties entered the financial negotiations of the contract with an incomplete understanding of the budget, or at best, a relatively high-level overview.  How each party dealt with this issue reveals something about their general approach to the negotiation process.

Rob's general tactic in the financial conversations was to rebuff any administration proposal by questioning the information presented.  Similar to his challenge of Peggy's budget reports, Rob talked to me about the "$100 million deficit" referenced repeatedly in the McKinsey Co. strategic planning work, saying that this was a bogus number with no basis in reality.  Rob's strategy for the financial part of the contract negotiation seemed to be that the necessary justice and the “due process” of the contract had to be borne out in analysis of MPS budget details.

I see little reason to believe that Emma and Board members understand the detail of the MPS budget much better than Rob, but they clearly have belief in the numbers generated by Peggy.  More importantly, it appears that they accept that school district budgeting (and perhaps public education itself) is an inexact science, and that district decisions can be made and successfully implemented without having to understand the specific effect of every enabling policy and financial element.  The clash between Rob’s moral challenges using analysis of details, and the administration’s focus on high-level discussion is something I witnessed repeatedly in the negotiation sessions.

External factors
I asked Emma and Rob about what factors influenced the final negotiations.  Rob talked about the well-executed press releases and other public relations from the district administration.  He said that he felt that the media, particularly the Star Tribune, unfairly took sides.  Rob seemed to say that MFT took the moral high road by not negotiating the contract through press releases and the media.

While there were clear elements of public support for the administration's position in the negotiation process (the Star Tribune editorial, the League of Women Voters Forum), Rob's comments are perhaps at least as reflective of a general lack of public support for the teachers' position.  There was pushback from the teachers and some organized labor allies, but there was generally no defense of the status quo teacher-placement system from the general public.

Emma felt that a key element for the administration was the unified support from the Board.  She said that from the very beginning of the negotiation process the Board was clear and unified about need to achieve interview-and-select, to a degree that she had not seen in any previous Board.  Emma said that she had worked with other Boards who would back down under pressure from parents and teachers, which often complicated her position at the bargaining table. 

Both Pam and Emma said that the Board and the administration were prepared for a strike, and it was their perception that MFT was not.  Emma said that as the negotiations became more heated and focused, her negotiating team had consultations with the Board preparing them for the potential public backlash that Board members would inevitably encounter if a strike occurred.  During the mediated negotiations, Board Member Tom Madden talked to me about the impressive volume of “hate email” he was receiving related to the negotiations.  Emma also related a story about how two of the Board members went to a holiday event at the Minneapolis Central Labor Union, where they caught a lot of flack, but held their ground.

It is unclear from my conversations exactly what role Superintendent Bill Green played in the negotiations, although it is clear that he was as consistent and unwavering in his support of the interview-and-select change as the Board.  It is also reasonable to assume that he received as much public response and "hate email" as Board members.  The Superintendent did issue a public statement about the need for interview-and-select as the negotiations entered mediation, and he sent a welcome-back note to teachers at the start of school, which contained language about the need for change.  The Superintendent also apparently continued one-on-one communication with Rob during the negotiations, and one administration negotiator told me that Rob at one point attempted to use that direct communication with the Superintendent as an "end run" around the strategy of the administration negotiation team.

The overall negotiation process
Pam, Rob, and Emma had generally different perspectives on the first phase of the process, from April through August, which was nominally “interest-based” negotiations and facilitated by the first BMS mediator.  One point of agreement was that this mediator was ineffective and unhelpful.

Pam said that the Board spent most of April through August essentially waiting for something to happen in the negotiations, while developing mounting frustration with the little that was produced by the process.  Pam said that the Board had a meeting with the administration negotiators in August where the Board strongly asserted that something had to change in the process.

Emma seemed to accept the April-August stage of negotiations as a reasonable attempt by the administration to play the teachers’ game, saying that this part of the process was fairly similar to what has happened in other negotiations with MFT.  However, Emma said that the interest-based negotiations never really worked this time, in part because each side had specific outcomes that they wanted.  She implied that trying to force these desired outcomes into the interest-based model was non-productive, and she told me that this part of the process convinced her that the administration should not use interest-based negotiations with MFT in the future. [Emma did say that they would continue to incorporate elements of interest-based bargaining, where appropriate, in future negotiations.  Emma said that this is a strategy that the MPS administration uses with other bargaining units.]

Emma said that she made the call to switch to positional bargaining at the end of August.  The negotiations in September and October completely changed course, with the administration essentially refusing to talk until MFT came up with a complete proposal.  MFT produced this proposal at the start of November, the administration produced their counter-proposal right before Thanksgiving, and the formal mediation started at the very end of November.

Rob suggested that the early part of the negotiations were mildly productive, although he seemed to blame the tone of this phase on the administration’s disinterest in real interest-based negotiations.  Rob remained incredulous about both the administration’s decision to switch to positional bargaining, and about the specific proposal that the administration presented in November, saying that it was a complete departure from what had previously been discussed.

MFT's approach to the contract negotiation
In my observations of the first phase of the negotiations, MFT consistently presented a united face at the bargaining table and did an exceptional job of masking any internal division.  There were indications of division within MFT during the negotiations and as the negotiations started in March, two district administrators told me that the MFT leadership had discussed or tried to block Rob from participating on the negotiation team.  But whatever internal division existed in MFT, Rob was the leading voice of MFT at the table and Rob’s personal approach to interaction with the administration obviously affected the course of this negotiation.

As I've suggested, part of what seems to motivate Rob is strong personal conviction about the role of the teachers union.  This is what drove him to challenge Louise for the MFT presidency, and it is reflected in his indignation about the tone and manner of the administration's approach at the negotiation table.

Rob's general adversarial tone appears to reflect an underlying attitude of the union leadership.  From other conversations that I have had with MFT leaders, it seems to be a pervasive opinion that the administration is not inclusive enough of teachers' opinions, and that positive achievements of MFT are not appreciated.  The union leadership seems to feel that the contributions of MPS teachers are multitudinous, but yet teachers are not appreciated or treated well by the administration.  This attitude was frequently evident in the emotional appeals of the MFT arguments at the negotiating table.

But Emma, the leading representative of the administration at the negotiating table, cannot be fairly accused of under-appreciating teachers.  Emma is unapologetic about the MPS disciplinary procedures for teachers, plainly stating her belief that MPS "runs a tight ship", and noting that MPS discharges tens of teachers each year.  However, in our conversations during the negotiations, Emma repeatedly talked about how MPS treats teachers as special employees, noting that they have the best benefits and that they have historically been the only bargaining unit that the administration has given the extra attention of interest-based bargaining.  Through the early stages of the recent contract negotiation, Emma was the most consistent defender of the slow process of listening to the list of teacher concerns.

In our recent conversation, Emma said that she thought it was a mistake for the administration to make any move without providing the teachers a chance for input, saying that whenever this isn't done up front, the process is inevitably delayed later to allow for teacher input.  Emma also has significant respect for the "progressive" elements of the MFT contract, particularly the teacher discipline process and the alternative compensation systems.

The union's charge of non-inclusion is more accurately leveled at the School Board (and perhaps the Superintendent), as evidenced by the Board-chartered strategic planning process that had minimal teacher input.  The Board/teacher disconnect was perhaps most plainly demonstrated in the mid-December Board meeting where the new MPS strategic plan was adopted.  The meeting had highly orchestrated shows of support from the Mayor of Minneapolis, the State Education Commissioner, and many others, but was preceded by a silent protest by teachers regarding the contract negotiations.

However, given the emotionally charged negotiation style of MFT, this disconnection may be necessary to some degree, to allow the Board to be dispassionate participants in the contract negotiations.

In addition to Rob's personal approach and the MFT leadership's general antagonism with the administration, the union membership bears responsibility for allowing a leadership that functions this way.  The membership allows a leadership that sees the generation of contract language as one of the few functions of the union, and then allows this to be executed by a small group. While an attempt was made to collect teacher opinion early in the process, and some amount of subcommittee work did inform the actions of the MFT negotiators, there was never any evident attempt to feed real information from the negotiating team back to the union membership during the negotiation process.

The MFT approach at the bargaining table reflects a teacher consciousness that is limited to a classroom-level view of the district.  Also, some amount of blind allegiance to the union is widely held, as witnessed by the call for all teachers to wear red and attend the Board meeting protest, in spite of having minimal information about what was being discussed at the negotiations.  This combination of limited scope and organizational patriotism was clearly evident in the MFT approach at the negotiating table, where the MFT issues were primarily complaints about current operating procedures, with no propositions for addressing the major district-level challenges of budget shortfalls, decreasing enrollment, and increased competition.

But it is the over-emphasis of the cloistered contract negotiations in the life of the union leads to the terrible bloating of the negotiation process and its creation, the contract.  From the start of the negotiations, too many topics were covered at the negotiation table that could be covered more effectively in other forums.  These included dissatisfaction with the K-5 report card, complaints about the number of district initiatives, and the infamous desks-for-specialists issue.  Discussing this with Emma, she blamed the laundry list of issues presented at the negotiating table on the odd operating practices of the union.  Emma said that there are at least six standing committees that consist of MFT and administration representatives, and that these committees meet regularly to discuss all types of issues of interest to the teachers.  Emma implied that these committees could address many of the issues that were brought by the teachers to the negotiations.

However, the MFT leadership populates most of the MFT seats on these committees, which could be held by any teacher.  This appears to be a characteristic of the internal politics of the union, to make a show about solving problems through the contract negotiation, and to downplay the ongoing communication with the administration.

Pam contrasted the internal dynamics of MFT to the dynamics of other unions that she is familiar with such as SEIU.  Pam noted that the internal workings of SEIU are much more democratic, where leadership is distributive and where internal leadership development is a specific focus.

Rob generally shared this perspective, saying that Louise’s long, tight reign led to many MFT members feeling disengaged or disenfranchised.  Emma's perspective on Louise's authority is more diplomatic; she describes Louise as having been given trust and authority by membership.  But whether Louise's consolidation of decision-making authority was given or taken, all seem to agree that her leadership style was centralized and controlling.  In addition, having MFT view the contract as the singular channel of communication between MFT and the administration is part of Louise's legacy.  Louise has stated in publication that she focused the work of the union on the MFT contract, because people read the contract, but nobody ever read district policy.

Summary
The essential elements that came together to shape the 2007 contract negotiations are:

• A union membership that allows leadership a cloistered ten-month process to create a two-year contract.
• Union leadership that sees the contract negotiations as the single defining conversation between the union and the administration.
• Union leadership that approaches contract negotiations as an emotional appeal for the respect of teachers.
• A union president on a personal mission against a system that was established by previous MFT negotiators and administrators.
• An administration negotiation team that accepts that listening to protracted teacher complaint is part of the negotiation process.
• A first-phase State mediator who was of minimal assistance to the process.

These factors shaped the negotiation process until September when mounting frustration by the Board and the administration clashed with the union president's tactic of defense by over-analysis and fine point argument.

After the negotiations entered the final, mediated stage, a conclusion was reached because:

• The Board that was strong and unified on the need for a particular change, and ultimately threatened to accept a strike unless they got what they wanted.
• There was some degree of division and disorganization in MFT, and MFT was not ready to strike to prevent interview-and-select.
• An effective mediator kept the conversation going
• An outsider (Kate from Education Minnesota) was brought in.  The exact effect of Kate's presence on the process is unclear, but it is likely that she moderated the personal approach of the union president.
• There was some amount of public pressure for the administration's position

Bottom line: To get interview-and-select, the administration had to spend ten months in negotiations and ultimately had to tell the teachers that they would take a strike if the new contract did not contain interview-and-select.

Conclusions for the future:
In summary analysis of the negotiation process, I see several critical themes:

• The Board and the Superintendent are THE critical elements for contract reform. The argument and support for future teacher contract change needs to go through them.
• It is problematic to have the teacher/administration relationship be so defined by the contract negotiation process.  This solitary process needs to be deemphasized and other, differentiated and continuing interactions need to be highlighted.

• Participation in and understanding of the district operating process by teachers (and preferably parents) would be beneficial.

Support for the Board
There may be value in considering exactly how the current Board and Superintendent came to a unified position in support of the change to interview-and-select.  I think it is clear one thing that defined the Board's position was the election of four new members who were installed only a few months before the negotiation process began.  These members carried a call for general change, and the specific idea of establishing interview-and-select as an element in MPS solutions.

Because the Board is such a critical element in contract reform, and because the Board members are not necessarily elected on the basis of their expertise in union dynamics and contract negotiations, future contract reform would benefit from establishing external support for the Board focused on elements for contract reform.  The Board would benefit from being provided data and strategy to achieve specific contract changes.  Strategic support and information would need to be generated by an external-to-MPS group focused on contract reform.

Other elements of such support that I consider important include:

• Reminding the Board that the mission of the Minneapolis Schools is "To ensure that all children learn".  The Board needs to be reminded that maintaining a system of learning is sometimes incongruent with maintaining a system of teaching.
• Generating public support for Board positions on change: Although there was minimal public opposition to implementation of interview-and-select, future contract changes could be more controversial, and could require strong and strategic public support for Board action.
• Creating a better general understanding of the roles of each part of the school system, including the union, the administration, the Board, and parents.

Decrease focus on contract negotiations
A decreased focus on the contract could be achieved in part by shortening the length of time spent negotiating the contract.  The contract negotiation process takes too long and is too much a singular focus of union/administration interactions.  The contract negotiation process is also a box that constrains the conversation between teachers and the administration, and it should be deemphasized in the teacher/district relationship.

The timing of the contract negotiations is mandated in state law.  The Minnesota PELRA law (179A.20) mandates that teacher contracts  "shall be for a term of two years, beginning on July 1 of each odd-numbered year". State law (123B.05) further states that the collective bargaining agreement must be signed by January 15 of an even-numbered calendar year, or state aid is reduced by $25 per student.  According to Emma, there is another rule or law that prescribes that the union must initiate the negotiation process around March of each odd-numbered year.

These legal constraints frame the timing of the protracted negotiation process, and Emma says that the length of time invested in the Minneapolis contract negotiation process is not unusual.  I believe that the negotiation process could be trimmed by several months.  Emma's proposal to eliminate interest-based negotiations would alone trim months off the process.  Positional bargaining would require that the face-to-face negotiations be preceded by a complete proposal from the teachers, which took at least six weeks to generate during this cycle, after several months of collecting membership input.

Build teacher involvement and leadership outside of the contract
Teachers need to be more widely engaged in district processes, and the district should work to create broad teacher leadership.   Ideally, the administration would be able to invite a broad range of teachers to participate in the various labor/management committees, which are now populated largely by members of the MFT leadership.  The district administration could also highlight the real or potential decision-making role of teachers on school site councils.  A district-wide site council congress could generate a broad-based voice of teachers with real power.

As a relatively simple first step to improved teacher engagement the district could widely publicize the work and membership of the teacher/administration committees, as well as other places where non-classroom teachers make substantial contributions to district-level policy and practice, such as curriculum committees.

Further exposure of the contract negotiation process may also be beneficial.  I feel that I was quite restrained in reporting my observations of the negotiations, and it might be worth considering more public exposure of the process next time.  While I breached the historical shroud of secrecy that surrounds the contract negotiations, reporting of the negotiations could be taken much further.  The Minnesota PELRA law (179A.14) states "All negotiations, mediation sessions, and hearings between public employers and public employees or their respective representatives are public meetings", and the open meeting law (13D) is clear that the same things can be expected of the negotiations as is of Board meetings (publication of meeting notices, sharing of printed material, and opportunities for public input).